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Abstract 
 
UK regulation discourages corporate political donations but is relatively benign in respect 
of individual donations. Few UK listed companies make political donations but many 
more company directors do. We use a unique, hand-collected dataset of political 
donations to examine whether UK corporate political connections are perceived as being 
created indirectly via directors’ personal donations. Basing our tests on the sensitivity of 
company returns to opinion polls preceding the 2010 General Election we find that, on 
average, firms in industries which donate only to the Conservative Party exhibit higher 
sensitivity to the electoral success of the Conservatives. However, within industries, there 
is no consistent evidence that the firms which employ directors who make these donations 
exhibit higher sensitivity than firms which do not. We justify basing our inferences on 
return sensitivity to polls by confirming that UK domestic political risk, as proxied by 
opinion poll changes, is priced around General Elections. 
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POLITICAL DONATIONS AND POLITICAL RISK IN THE UK:  
EVIDENCE FROM A CLOSELY-FOUGHT ELECTION  
 
1. Introduction 
The existence of ties between politicians and the corporate world is not a new phenomenon 
and there is a growing body of research which investigates links between politics and stock 
markets. Early work, such as Jayachandran (2006), suggests that domestic political risk is 
priced, evidence supported by subsequent research such as Boutchkova et al. (2012) and Belo 
et al. (2013), which links the cash flow variability of individual firms or industries to 
government activities. More recently, attention has turned to the sources and value of 
corporate political connections.  
One of the most frequently analysed sources of connection, particularly in the US, is 
corporate political donations. Such donations represent a significant proportion of political 
finance in the US and there is mounting evidence that they contribute to corporate value. For 
example, Cooper et al. (2010) find that corporate donations to political candidates and parties 
affect both share returns and future profitability (see also Claessens et al., 2008 and Akey, 
2015).  
The US political finance framework contrasts sharply with that of the UK, where regulation 
discourages corporate political contributions: UK companies must obtain shareholder 
approval for political donations above £5,000 during any 12-month period and all political 
contributions over £200 must be disclosed in the annual financial statements. Conversely, the 
UK system is relatively benign in respect of individual contributions: while US federal law 
restricts the amounts that individuals can contribute to each political party or candidate, there 
is no such limit in the UK. Only 6% of the 300 largest listed UK companies donated to the 
two main political parties – Conservatives and Labour – in the period between 2005 and 
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2010, but 17% of these companies employed at least one director who made a personal 
contribution. While total corporate political donations from these 300 companies amounted to 
less than £500,000 over the period, their directors donated about £2.4 million. 1  These 
amounts may seem small but, unlike in the US, campaign expenditure in the UK is capped, 
potentially increasing the salience of a large individual donation: in 2010 the maximum 
expenditure during the year preceding the polling date was £19.5 million per party (Electoral 
Commission, 2011, p2). In addition, whereas in the US company managers might make 
donations as a group via corporate PACs, in the UK the value of an individual director’s 
political donations is more transparent. 
An intriguing question is whether the different regulatory frameworks that apply to political 
finance in the US and UK have implications for the roles played by corporate and individual 
donations. In particular, since the contribution made by UK listed companies is so slight, 
might it be that political donations made by their directors are viewed as surrogate corporate 
donations? This paper investigates these questions and, to our knowledge, is the first to do so.   
Although some of our results suggest that directors’ donations could be perceived as 
associated with the company on whose board they sit, we find no fully convincing evidence 
that this is the case. However, it does appear that political donations, either by the company 
or by a director, do indicate an industry-wide political affiliation. Our most consistent results 
suggest that industries which, in our sample, donate exclusively to the Conservative Party, 
comprise of companies which are particularly sensitive to the electoral fortunes of the 
Conservatives. 
                                                        
1 Contributions from privately-held companies were higher than from listed companies and their directors, 
potentially giving these firms an influential role in the political process. 
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Our empirical analysis exploits a unique, hand-collected dataset of political contributions 
made by directors of UK companies, data available only since 2001. Figure 1 summarises the 
sources of political finance for the two main UK parties between 2005 and 2010, and shows 
that the Conservatives, traditionally more pro-business, have greater access to funds. Almost 
half of their donations (£65 million out of £133 million) came from individuals, a higher level 
of donations than any other group. The trades unions were the major source of funding for the 
Labour Party (£49 million out of £84 million), potentially creating indirect political links for 
companies in highly-unionised sectors. We therefore augment our political donations data 
with industry-level measures of worker unionisation rates. 
[Figure 1] 
We base our identification strategy around the 2010 UK General Election. Following Acker 
and Duck (2015) we use the high-frequency reporting of opinion poll data during election 
campaigns to obtain firm-level measures of political affiliation and sensitivity. The response 
of share prices to changes in the polls allows us to identify companies as being either pro-
Conservative or pro-Labour.2 Unlike a standard event study approach, which would examine 
stock price reactions to the announcement of the election outcome, the technique does not 
rely on the outcome’s unexpectedness, or on the precision with which the event date is 
determined. This is a particularly attractive feature in the case of the 2010 election, the 
                                                        
2  Related papers in the political science literature (e.g. Herron, 2000 and Knight, 2007) first identify firms 
which they predict should be sensitive to particular election outcomes due to director political connections, and 
then examine the accuracy of the prediction. We allow the data to identify firms’ sensitivities. Similarly, 
Coulomb and Sangnier (2014) find share prices of companies connected to the French presidential candidate 
Sarkozy react positively to an increase in the perceived probability of his election, whereas those of companies 
connected to his main rival react negatively. 
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outcome of which – a Conservative-led coalition government – was unclear for several days 
following polling day. 
Before analysing the role of political donations, we first confirm that our measure of political 
sensitivity captures the sign and size of individual companies’ political affiliation. To do this 
we examine the relationship between our measure and post-polling day abnormal returns for 
five UK General Election campaigns from 1992 to 2010. Using multiple elections allows us 
to sharpen our tests, contrasting the results for closely-fought elections where the outcome 
was highly uncertain with those for elections which involved much less political risk. The 
results strongly suggest that a priced political factor does exist around elections, and that our 
poll-based measure is a suitable proxy for firms’ general political sensitivity. 
We then use our political sensitivity measure for 2010 to address our main question: whether 
political finance derived from directors of UK listed companies appears to have implications 
for the companies themselves. We examine the relationships between the political finance 
sources and both the sign and the size of the political sensitivities but find no consistent 
evidence that firms with Conservative director-donors exhibit higher political sensitivity than 
those without. 
However, we also compare different groups of industries, focusing on a set where we observe 
donations – whether direct corporate donations or via directors – going only to the 
Conservative Party. We contrast these with a set of ‘mixed donor’ industries, which either 
donate to both parties or which do not donate at all. We find that firms in the Conservative-
only donating industries exhibit, on average, higher sensitivity to a Conservative victory than 
do firms in the mixed donor industries. Robustness checks using cumulative abnormal returns 
and share prices from the Intrade prediction market confirm these results. By contrast, we 
find no evidence of a relationship between our industry-level measure of the degree of worker 
union membership and political sensitivity.  
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Our results suggest that any links that might exist between political donations and corporate 
value in the UK are more tenuous than in the US. While it is possible that political donations 
are made by directors in the expectation of a tangible benefit, and that there are spillover 
benefits from donating firms and directors to entire industries, our findings are open to other 
interpretations. For example, a positive relationship between firm value and the presence of 
donating directors could be driven by assortative matching between firms, directors and 
political parties due to a common unobserved ideology, irrespective of any influence of the 
donation on government policy. So, while positive findings are consistent with the view that 
donations are made to support a party which either has historically espoused policies which 
benefit the industry, or which appears open to adopting such policies, they may simply 
suggest that directors who donate to these parties are typically recruited to these firms and 
make political donations primarily for purely personal reasons.  
Director donations may be made either for consumption value as suggested by Ansolabere et 
al. (2003) in the US context, or as an individual investment. While differences in regulation 
might lie behind the divergent findings between the UK and the US, it is possible that the 
individual investment motive is stronger in the UK. This is due to another distinct feature of 
the UK political system: political parties can nominate individuals for political appointments 
in the form of a peerage, and a seat in the House of Lords. Indeed, we find that directors who 
make political donations are on average older and more likely to be UK nationals, consistent 
with them seeking a UK political appointment in the later stages of their career (Mell et al., 
2015). 
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 explores motives for making individual political 
donations. In section 3 we outline our estimation approach. Section 4 discusses the data and 
section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes. We include three appendices: Appendix A 
giving background on the UK election system and on the five elections which we investigate; 
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Appendix B detailing our tests on the poll-based political sensitivity measures; and Appendix 
C containing additional results. 
2. Motives for making individual political donations  
Political donations can be categorised as either consumption or investment goods, depending 
on the motivation for the donation (see, for example, Ansolabehere et al., 2003). As a 
consumption good a donation is made with no expectation of a direct tangible reward, with 
value instead derived from political participation. The motivation behind such donations is 
individual utility maximisation, as might be the case with purely charitable donations, where 
in both cases if such donations are a normal good, their value would be expected to rise with 
income. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) conclude that the US evidence is supportive of campaign 
contributions being consumption goods, given their relatively small magnitude, and since 
there is no clear evidence that campaign contributions influence voting behaviour.  
Nevertheless, it is plausible in the UK context that political donations are, at least in part, 
made as an investment in the expectation of a tangible benefit. The benefit, such as the award 
of a political position, might accrue directly to the individual donor. In the UK there is 
evidence that individuals are keen to buy their way into the UK political arena, perhaps 
attracted to the kudos of a peerage, carrying with it the entitlement to sit in the House of 
Lords. For example, Mell et al. (2015) provide evidence that donations are linked to 
individual peerage nominations; and in 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair and politicians of 
other parties were questioned by police as part of their investigation into the Cash for 
Honours affair, which concerned the possibility that political parties were taking loans from 
supporters in return for nominations to the House of Lords. More recently, concerns were 
raised about potential conflicts of interest when Mr John Nash was given a peerage and made 
education minister in 2013, after he and his wife made a series of donations to the 
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Conservative Party. This followed other concerns relating to donations to the Conservatives’ 
health spokesman, made in 2010 when Mr Nash was chairman of Care UK, a company 
providing services to the National Health Service (NHS). 3 
As the disquiet regarding these donations demonstrates, if the donor is the director of a 
company the benefit from the donation might also accrue indirectly to the employing firm. 
One obvious route is through the award of contracts. See, for example, reports of NHS 
contracts being awarded to Circle Health, a private healthcare firm, in February 2014, 
following donations to the Conservative Party made by linked investors; and advertising and 
publicity contracts awarded to Carat, part of the Dentsu Aegis Network after regular 
donations made by Jerry Buhlmann, its chief executive to the constituency of Michael Gove, 
the Conservative Party’s then Justice Secretary. 4 
In general, however, these indirect rewards are likely to be less easy to identify and quantify. 
Donations might facilitate access to politicians, for example, allowing directors to influence 
political decision-making in a way that benefits the company. As an example, the 
Conservative Party treasurer, Peter Cruddas, was forced to resign in 2012 after he was 
covertly filmed offering “access to David Cameron and other leading members of the 
Government in exchange for donations to the Conservative Party. As party treasurer, he told 
the [Sunday Times’] undercover reporters that if they made substantial donations to the party 
they would have an opportunity to influence Government policy and to gain unfair 
                                                        
3 https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/jan/10/gove-appoints-john-nash-education-minister; 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1243579/Andrew-Lansley-embroiled-cash-influence-row-accepting-
21-000-donation-Care-UK-chairman-John-Nash.html (both accessed 22 April, 2018). 
 4http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/fury-tory-party-donors-handed-3123469; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/conservative-party-donor-jerry-buhlmann-receives-39m-
treasury-contracts-a6927866.html; (both accessed 22 April, 2018). 
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commercial advantage through confidential meetings.” Such access need not necessarily be 
covert: in 2011 there were reports of property developers paying via the Conservative 
Property Forum for breakfast meetings with senior Conservative MPs.  More recently, reports 
have emerged that directors of oil companies have donated over £390,000 to the Conservative 
Party since Theresa May became Prime Minister.5 
Of course this type of political access and influence need not imply corruption, but rather an 
efficient transfer of knowledge which can inform optimal policy decisions: politicians 
wanting advice or expertise relating to particular sectors might simply find it more efficient to 
seek it from donors with whom they have an established connection. The time a politician 
spends in becoming informed on a particular issue does, after all, impose an opportunity cost 
(see Grossman and Helpman, 2001, for a discussion of this issue). Equally, making donations 
may be a matter of maintaining reputation and social capital in general. For example, 
company directors are likely to attend charitable and social events, some of which may be 
political fundraisers for the Conservative Party. Any associated donations may not therefore 
necessarily reflect directors’ specific political preferences.6  
Our empirical exercise is founded on the premise that if political donations are investment 
goods we would expect the investment to deliver a greater benefit to the individual or firm if 
the party to which they donate gains political power. The winning party has the ability to 
make individual political appointments, and to determine regulation, fiscal policy and 
industrial policy in a way that might positively affect firm success. On the basis of this 
                                                        
5 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-sunday-times-statement-vkzhxhp85hx; 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/hands-off-our-land/8754027/Conservatives-given-millions-by-property-
developers.html;  https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/may/23/oil-bosses-have-given-390000-to-tories-
conservatives-under-theresa-may; (all accessed 22 April, 2018). 
6 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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argument we investigate whether there is evidence that directors’ donations are perceived as 
investment goods which do not solely benefit the director, by examining whether political 
donations are positively associated with firms’ political sensitivities.  
Evidence of a positive association between a firm’s political sensitivity and its directors’ 
donations to the winning party would support this hypothesis, but does not rule out the 
possibility that the donating directors also gain direct rewards, or simply increased utility, 
from their donations. A positive relationship could, at least in part, be driven by some form of 
selection or assortative matching. Assortative matching between firms, directors and political 
parties due to some common unobserved ideology would result in a positive correlation 
between sector-level, and within that, company-level returns, even if government policy is 
not in any way influenced by the donation or the donating director. For example, certain 
sectors might be favoured by a particular political party’s stance, firms within these sectors 
might recruit directors who share the same political leanings and who also donate to the 
party, and these views may have also determined the director’s own choice of job. Indeed, 
those firms that could gain the most within a sector from a particular political party being in 
power are more likely to recruit, and more likely to be attractive to donating directors.  
A final possibility, as raised by Raff and Siming (2016), is that the direction of causality may 
be reversed. Rather than director political connections influencing government policy and 
subsequently firm performance, it may be that the prospect of a political appointment, such as 
membership of the House of Lords, affects CEO incentives and firm performance in a way 
which maximises politicians’ objectives, which, as the authors find, may be at odds with 
those of shareholders. They show, using data over 15 years, that the abolition of knighthoods 
and damehoods in New Zealand acted to increase firm profitability and decrease firm 
employment, with their subsequent re-instatement having the opposite effects. While we 
cannot rule out that such incentives may also be at work due to the UK Honours system, and 
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that those directors who donate may be more likely face such incentives, it is not clear that 
government and shareholders’ objectives will always be in conflict, hence it is difficult to 
theoretically sign the direction of any effect. 
3. Estimation approach 
In this section we first specify the returns model we use to estimate both our measure of 
company political sensitivity and post-polling day abnormal returns. We then discuss how we 
exploit variation in electoral conditions between 1992 and 2010 to test whether political risk 
is priced around general elections, and to confirm the validity of our measure of individual 
firms’ political sensitivity. Finally, we outline how we investigate the relationships between 
our measure of political sensitivity and financial political connections.  
3.1. Returns and the pricing of domestic political sensitivity  
There is a large literature that investigates the degree to which equity markets are globally 
integrated, Stehle (1977) being probably the earliest example. With full global integration, 
country-specific risk – and domestic political risk in particular – will not be priced. But 
domestic risk will command a premium if not all investors within a country are globally 
diversified. While there is general agreement that the degree of integration is time-varying 
(see Bekaert and Harvey, 1995 and Arouri et al., 2012 for example), the evidence for full 
versus partial integration is mixed. For example, Bali and Cakici (2010) find that world 
market risk is not priced, while country-specific total and idiosyncratic risks do carry a 
premium.  This finding is contradicted for developed markets by Arouri et al. (2012), who 
find that the total risk premium in these markets is largely explained by global factors. 
Many studies examine markets around election dates, on the argument that a priced domestic 
political factor is likely to be particularly evident at these times. Although Santa-Clara and 
Valkanov (2003) find that their US Democratic risk premium is not concentrated around 
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election dates, much other work does find evidence of such a factor. For example, Li and 
Born (2006), studying the US market, and Bialkowski et al. (2008), studying 27 OECD 
countries, establish that volatility rises around elections, particularly those where the outcome 
is uncertain. Work by Pantzalis et al. (2000) on 45 countries suggests that at least some of 
this volatility, and its resolution, is associated with higher returns. More recently, Liu, Shu, 
and Wei (2017) provide evidence that political risk is priced in China. 
Our returns model is based on the premise that country-specific risk is priced, and that 
domestic political risk is critical at election dates. We use the model given in equation (1), a 
parsimonious version of the partial integration framework used in Bekaert et al. (2014). We 
estimate the model using daily returns during the 250 days ending 2 months before the 
election is called, plus the ‘campaign period’. Figure 2 shows the timeline of the estimation 
and event periods for the 2010 election. 
[Figure 2] 
The campaign period is defined as the interval preceding an election during which opinion 
polls are revised on a daily basis. UK election campaigns have historically been far shorter 
than those in the US. Before 2011 parliaments were of variable length, the election date being 
announced about one month in advance (see Appendix A). Our campaign period therefore 
begins approximately three weeks before polling day, shortly after the election is called.  
Our model takes the form: 
( ) ( ), 0, 1, , 0, 1, , 0, 1, , ,w w UK UKi t i i t w t i i t UK t i i t i s t i tR EL R EL R EL R e      = + + + + + + +  (1)  
where ,i tR  is the excess return – over the risk-free rate – on stock i on day t;  
,w tR  is the excess return on the Datastream world market index on day t in Sterling, re-
calculated to exclude UK market returns;  
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,UK tR  is the excess return on the FTSE-Allshare market index on day t;   
ELt is an indicator variable which equals 1 when t is in the campaign period, and 0 otherwise. 
The interaction terms between ELt and the UK and world factors account for the 
possibility that the heightened political risk during this period systematically affects 
groups of stocks, altering relationships among the factors and individual firms;7 and 
,s tR  is the return on day t of a portfolio with unit exposure to UK election-related political 
risk. ,s tR  takes a value of zero when t lies outside the campaign period (i.e. when ELt 
equals zero). During the campaign period (i.e. when ELt equals 1) we assume that ,s tR  is 
proportionate to Δpt, the change in the probability of electoral success of the eventual 
winning party (pt) on day t, so the loadings on the political factor are estimated up to a 
constant of proportionality. Estimation of Δpt is discussed in detail in section 4.5. 
As can be seen from equation (1), the sign of ˆi , our political sensitivity measure, indicates 
the political affiliation of firm i. In an election ultimately won by the Conservatives, for 
example, ˆi  will be positive for those stocks which during the election campaign exhibit a 
tendency to rise with the expectation of a Conservative victory (pro-Conservative stocks), 
and negative for pro-Labour stocks. The absolute magnitude of ˆi  is a measure of the extent 
to which stock i is generally sensitive to the election outcome.  
Finally, we estimate the post-election period abnormal return for stock i using the parameters 
estimated in equation (1). 
 
 
                                                        
7 We thank the editor for alerting us to this possibility. 
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3.2. Testing the measure of political sensitivity 
Our approach relies on the ˆi  measures providing a good proxy for political sensitivity. We 
test this by exploiting variation in electoral conditions over time and calculating separate sets 
of ˆi s for all elections between 1992 and 2010. This allows us to contrast the results for 
closely-fought elections where the outcome was highly uncertain with those for elections 
involving much less political risk. Political risk during an election will be at its highest and 
most clearly observable when an election outcome is unpredictable – with probabilities of 
success for each of the two main UK parties of around 50%, and/or substantial variability in 
opinion poll predictions – and when there are clear differences between the policies of the 
contending parties. In addition, the announcement of the election result will have a greater 
effect on stock returns the more surprising is the result.   
A description of the UK electoral system and of the elections themselves is given in 
Appendix A. Of the five elections, those in 1997, 2001 and 2005 were the most predictable 
and had the smallest variability in opinion poll predictions during the campaigns. The 
differences between the parties were at their highest in 1992 and 2010. In 1992 there were 
strong ideological differences between the two parties, especially about privatisation, 
differences that had largely disappeared by 1997 with the advent of Tony Blair and New 
Labour. In 2010 there was sharp disagreement about the correct response to the credit crisis, 
especially about the speed with which the UK budget deficit should be eliminated.  
If political risk is priced and our ˆi  measures are fair estimates of sensitivity to this risk, we 
should therefore observe not only that pro-Conservative companies show positive 
(cumulative) abnormal returns at the resolutions of the 1992 and 2010 elections, with pro-
Labour companies showing the opposite, but also that the abnormal returns are positively 
related to the ˆi  measures. Moreover the abnormal returns should be more evident in the 
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1992 election than the 2010 election because of the misleading opinion polls and consequent 
surprise result in 1992; and also because of the protracted post-poll negotiation period in 
2010, which makes it difficult to identify the ‘announcement’ date. 8 In contrast, there should 
be little evidence of politically-related abnormal returns at the resolution of the 1997, 2001 
and 2005 elections, whose results were strongly and accurately predicted. Appendix B 
outlines how we test these predictions using OLS regressions and returns on portfolios 
constructed on the basis of the ˆi s.   
3.3. Political finance and political sensitivity 
For our main analysis of the 2010 election, we take a number of approaches to evaluate the 
relationships between firm characteristics and both the sign and the magnitude of our political 
sensitivity measure, ˆ
i . We begin by estimating equation (2), a probit model, where the 
dependent variable, ˆPosi , takes the value one if ˆi  is positive, and where 𝑿𝑖 represents a set 
of explanatory variables. 
Pr ( ˆPos
i = 1) = Φ(𝜽𝑿𝑖). (2)  
𝑿𝑖 includes three types of variable: measures of financial connections, which are our main 
variables of interest; firm-level control variables; and industry indicators. 
  
                                                        
8 For all elections other than 2010 we measure abnormal returns over the day following polling day, when the 
results were officially announced. We discuss the 2010 election in Appendix A, and consider two possible event 
periods, one ending on 12 May, and one ending on 13 May. We repeated all tests cumulating returns over both 
periods and results were qualitatively similar, so we present only those for the 5-day trading period to 13 May. 
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Financial connections 
DonDirConi, an indicator variable which equals 1 if company i has a Conservative 
‘director-donor’, that is, any director on company i’s board at the time of the election who 
donated to the Conservative Party between June 2005 and April 2010; and 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
, a measure of the degree of unionisation in firm i’s two-digit industry, j, measured as 
the share of industry employees who are union members in 2009.   
Our prior is that if director donations represent a form of political connection which is 
perceived by the markets to be beneficial for the employing company, then the probability of 
ˆ
i  taking a positive value will be positively associated with the Conservative Party director-
donor indicator. The predicted relationship between the sign of ˆ
i  and the degree of 
unionisation is less clear-cut. One could argue that companies with a history of high worker 
representation would be closer to the Labour Party and hence benefit from its election. 
Alternatively, a highly-unionised workforce combined with a Labour Party in power might be 
seen by the markets as a threat to profits. We are therefore agnostic about the sign on the 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗  variable.  
Firm-level control variables 
We incorporate as control variables two other firm-level characteristics which might 
plausibly affect their political sensitivity: 
LnMVi, log of company market value; and  
Leveragei, since a major focus of debate in this election was how to deal with the credit 
crisis, so highly-leveraged companies might be expected to be particularly sensitive to the 
outcome.  
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A firm’s percentage of foreign sales is also a potentially important independent variable, but 
was available for only 245 out of the 300 firms. When we included it as an additional control, 
the coefficients were generally not significant at conventional levels, and its inclusion had no 
material effect on our main results. 
Industry indicators 
We include two alternative types of industry indicator. 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖
𝑘 is a standard indicator variable which equals 1 if company i is in broad industry k, 
based on ten categories defined using the Industry Classification Benchmark.  
Indicators for the ‘Conservative-only donor’ industries versus the ‘mixed donor’ 
industries. GpAi, is an indicator variable which equals 1 if firm i is in Group A, the set of 
industries whose donations – whether direct corporate donations or via directors – go only 
to the Conservative Party. GpBi, is an indicator variable which equals 1 if firm i is in the 
set of ‘mixed donor’ industries – those which either donate to both parties or which do not 
donate at all. 9  We also consider interactions between these indicators and our main 
variables of interest to examine cross-group heterogeneity in the estimated coefficients.  
To focus on the relationship between the magnitude of ˆ
i and the political connections 
measures we estimate OLS and quantile regressions. The quantile regressions both mitigate 
the effect of outliers and incorporate more flexibility than is possible in an OLS conditional 
mean model, allowing us to explore how the estimated relationships vary across the 
conditional distribution of ˆ
i . For example, we might expect larger companies to be less 
                                                        
9 These indicators are defined based on the set of firms in our estimation sample. We cannot rule out that other, 
smaller listed firms within the Conservative-only donor industry group also make donations directly or 
indirectly via their directors to the Labour Party. 
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vulnerable to domestic political events than smaller ones so their ˆ
i s will generally be closer 
to zero. For pro-Labour companies, with negative ˆ
i s which lie in the low conditional 
quantiles, market value will therefore have a dampening, positive influence. For pro-
Conservative companies, with positive ˆ
i s in the high conditional quantiles, market value 
will have a dampening, negative influence. Furthermore, using a quantile regression will 
allow us to identify whether there is a different relationship between donations and the ˆ
i s in 
the tails of the conditional distribution. For example, it is possible that the marginal effect of 
having a Conservative director-donor is greater among companies in the top tail of the 
distribution, which would potentially benefit the most from a Conservative-led government. 
Hence we estimate the models shown in equations (3a) and (3b). 
ˆ
i = 𝜽𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (3a) 
ˆ
i = 𝜽𝒒𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑞𝑖,       where 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑞 ( ˆi |𝑿𝑖) = 𝜽𝒒𝑿𝑖, (3b)  
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑞 ( ˆi |𝑿𝑖)  is the qth conditional quantile of ˆi  given Xi, and 𝜽𝒒  is the vector of 
parameters relating to that quantile.  
Finally, we conduct robustness tests to address potential estimation error in our measure of 
political sensitivity. We repeat the tests using as dependent variables the two alternative 
political sensitivity measures discussed above: post-poll cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
over the 2010 event period ending on 13 May (see footnote 8); and a ˆi  based on share prices 
from Intrade, a prominent prediction market at the time of the election. We also carry out a 
weighted least squares estimation with each of the two ˆi  measures as dependent variable, in 
each case weighting by the t-statistic of the ˆ
i , thereby giving more weight to those 
observations whose ˆi  is estimated with least error. 
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4. Data and descriptive statistics 
For our main analysis of political finance at the 2010 General Election we need a sufficiently 
large sample of donations, while minimising effects of thin trading on the estimation of the 
ˆ
i s. We first collected data on donations made by the largest 500 UK listed companies or by 
their directors, and of these we selected the largest 300 for use in estimation, as this captured 
almost all of those which donated either directly or via directors. For our tests of the validity 
of the ˆi s as political sensitivity measures across all five elections between 1992 and 2010 
we chose a slightly smaller sample size of the largest 250 companies, because this further 
mitigates the thin trading problem and we are not constrained by the requirement to have a 
useable donations sample. We repeated these tests on the larger 2010 sample as a robustness 
check. All financial data used to estimate equation (1) are from Thomson Datastream. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on our data relating to the largest 300 firms in 2010 and 
the following sections discuss these variables in more detail. 
[Table 1] 
4.1. Donations 
From January 2001 donations to political parties amounting to more than £7,500 from a 
single source in a calendar year have been published by the UK Electoral Commission. The 
data are available from its website and include the date of donation, donor type, donor name, 
donation recipient and the amount donated. We downloaded details of all donations to 
political parties and candidates reported by the Commission between June 2005 – the month 
following the 2005 election – and April 2010. We assigned donations made to individuals to 
the political party which the candidate represented. 
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Using BoardEx we matched donations by individuals to information on directors of our 
sample of companies. Matching donor names with director names is not straightforward 
because in many cases the names of donors in the Electoral Commission dataset contain an 
abbreviation of some sort. We therefore carried out the matching manually. 
We define company i as a ‘director-donor employer’ if at the time of the 2010 UK General 
Election it employed at least one director who made at least one personal political donation 
between June 2005 and April 2010. Note that one director could sit on the boards of several 
companies at the same time and, if that was the case, we attribute the donation to all the 
companies that employed the director. The busiest director was sitting on the boards of three 
different companies in our estimation sample at the time of the election. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that 14% of companies in our sample are identified as employing 
Conservative director-donors, while only 2% of companies employed Labour director-
donors. In terms of corporate donations only 2% and 3.7% of the companies donated directly 
to the Conservatives and Labour respectively. The average amount donated attributable to 
one company conditional on the company being a Conservative director-donor employer was 
£55,877, with a maximum of £578,621 and a minimum of £1,500. The value of these 
donations dwarfs donations made directly by companies, and donations to the Labour Party.  
4.2. Political sensitivity and donation patterns by industry 
Panel B in Table 1 splits industries into the two groups defined above, A and B. It shows that 
donation patterns vary quite widely across industries. Indeed, no donations are made by any 
companies or directors in the Technology industry, 10 and there are no director donors in the 
Utilities industry (we discuss director characteristics in these industries in section 4.4).  
                                                        
10  A 2010 US study reported that companies in the Information Technology industry – equivalent to our 
Technology industry – were the least likely to make politically-driven expenditures (Welsh and Young, 2010). 
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Group A industries, where no donations to the Labour Party are observed, have markedly 
higher mean ˆi s and cumulative abnormal returns than do Group B industries.
11 t-tests of 
differences between the two groups’ means for each variable show that they are statistically 
significantly different at standard levels. Figure 3 shows kernel density plots for each of these 
two variables for the two industry groups. The distribution for Group A industries tends to lie 
to the right of that for Group B. For our main measure of political sensitivity ˆi , the mean 
and median for the whole sample are both positive: as might be predicted, there is a tendency 
for share returns to indicate more support for the traditionally pro-business party, the 
Conservatives, rather than for Labour.   
[Figure 3] 
The last column in Panel B summarises 𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
, the degree of unionisation in firm i’s two-digit 
industry, j. This is measured as the fraction of workers that report being union members in 
2009 and varies at the two-digit industry level. It is derived from the UK Labour Force 
Survey. Unionisation rates are similar across the Group A and B industries. 
4.3. Company characteristics 
Panel C in Table 1 summarises mean company characteristics by industry. Company 
financial characteristics are obtained from Datastream, and characteristics on board 
membership from BoardEx. The asterisks against the Group A industry means in row 1 of the 
panel denote the statistical significance of t-tests of differences between Group A and Group 
B means.   
Market value was measured at the start of March 2010, the month in which the election was 
called. Group A companies are, on average, significantly larger than Group B companies.  
                                                        
11 ˆi s based on Intrade prices exhibited the same patterns so are not shown, for reasons of space. 
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We incorporate (logged) market value in our regression tests, as we do leverage – the book 
value of debt divided by total assets – which is lower for Group A companies but only 
moderately so. The means of return on assets (RoA) and Tobin’s q are not significantly 
different between the two groups. Group A firms have slightly higher board size, as would be 
expected given their higher market values, but not markedly so. 
We also examined changes in RoA and sales following the election to identify whether 
donating exclusively to the Conservative Party might have improved company performance, 
as is hinted at by the anecdotal evidence discussed in section 2. We do not present the data as, 
although summary statistics suggested that RoA increased more for Group A firms in the first 
year after the election, and, more strongly, that sales rose more for Group A firms, we found 
no evidence that these differences could be ascribed to donating characteristics. 
4.4. Characteristics of donating directors 
Panel D in Table 1 summarises characteristics of donating versus non-donating directors by 
industry. The first column shows that donors in Group A industries, who by definition donate 
only to the Conservative Party, sit on only one board within the 300 firms in our estimation 
sample, while on average director donors in Group B industries sat on 1.5 boards (none of 
them sat on the boards of companies in Group A). This means that, in cases where Group B 
directors did donate to the Conservative Party, not only was any impact of their donations on 
the company frequently ‘diluted’ by donations to the Labour Party but it was also diluted by 
being associated with more than one company. Non-donor directors in Group A industries 
also typically sat on fewer boards within this set of larger listed firms, but we find no 
differences either between donor and non-donor directors, or between Group A and Group B 
industries in the number of other listed and private companies on which they hold board 
seats. 
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We also look at the fraction who are Executive versus non-Executive directors, and the 
fraction who hold the position of CEO or Chairman. We find few significant differences, but 
it is worth bearing in mind the small sample of director donors. Finally, we tabulate the mean 
age of directors and the proportion who are UK nationals. The table indicates that director 
donors are more likely to be older, and much more likely to be UK nationals.   
Two industries, Utilities and Technology contain no director donors. The table indicates that 
the characteristics of directors in these industries are more in line with those of non-donor 
directors than donor directors in the other sectors. For example, they are typically younger, 
and in the Technology industry they are less likely to be UK nationals. 
4.5. Variation in the probability of winning the election, Δpt 
pt is measured as the difference between the opinion poll percentage favouring the eventual 
election winner and that favouring the eventual loser.  
For the 2010 election we have three sources of publicly-available data that were updated 
daily: the BBC Poll of Polls, the Aggregate Poll published in the Guardian newspaper, and 
the YouGov poll, published in the Sun or the Sunday Times newspapers. Of these the Poll of 
Polls and the Aggregate Poll incorporated many other opinion polls; the Poll of Polls was 
based on the smoothed median of recent opinion polls, while the Aggregate Poll did not 
distinguish between ‘stale’ and recent polls.  Raw data from many polls are also available to 
us for this election so there are many different methods we could choose to combine the data, 
and no theory to guide us on the most appropriate choice. Our main method takes a simple 
average of all three daily-updated polls, as being as good a combination scheme as any other: 
it gives more weight to the individual poll which changes daily, incorporates other polls, and 
adopts a certain degree of smoothing via the Poll of Polls.  
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As a robustness check we use data on contract prices on Intrade, the main prediction market 
operating at the time of the 2010 election. Prediction markets offer the opportunity to trade in 
shares which pay out a fixed amount on the occurrence of an event, such as ‘The 
Conservatives to win the UK Election’. Since they pay out nothing if the event does not 
occur, the price of such shares is generally taken to be the market’s estimate of the 
probability of the event occurring. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007), for example, cite numerous 
empirical studies which have found that the probability of a binary prediction-market contract 
paying off is fairly represented by its price (for example Berg et al., 2008, Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz, 2006 and Tetlock, 2004). The Conservatives-to-win Intrade contract price is 
therefore a more direct indication of opinions about the probability of Conservative election 
success than the party’s percentage vote share as predicted by the polls. The prediction 
market also has the advantage that we can identify the time at which a trade was made and a 
price set, unlike opinion poll data, for which it is not clear exactly when the data become 
public information. However, there is relatively thin trading in the shares, so we use this 
measure simply as a robustness test of the poll-based one.  
For the analysis of the 1992 election we use the data given in ap Gwilym and Buckle (1994). 
Data for the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections are available from various internet sources, and 
we construct averages of percentages across those polls for which we can obtain information, 
taking account only of newly-published polls. 
5. Results 
We first summarise our tests to demonstrate the validity of our political sensitivity measure, 
and then discuss our results on the relationship between our measure of political sensitivity 
and political financial connections. 
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5.1. Tests on ˆi  as a political sensitivity proxy 
In this section we summarise the evidence for the validity of our ˆi  estimates as a measure of 
political sensitivity; Appendix B presents the full results of the tests. Following the 
predictions in Section 3.2 we first run OLS regressions to estimate the relationship between 
the ˆi  measures and company abnormal returns for each of five elections, contrasting the 
results for the closely-fought elections with those for which the outcome was easily predicted. 
The results are reported in Table B1 in Appendix B. We find little evidence of a relationship 
between the ˆi  measures and abnormal returns in the non-closely fought elections, but for 
both the 1992 and 2010 elections we find a positive and significant relationship between the 
political sensitivity measure and (cumulative) abnormal returns, particularly for 1992.  
These results are supported by a set of tests on (cumulative) abnormal returns of portfolios 
which are long in high ˆi s and short in low ˆi s, which are reported in Appendix B. The 
mean and median (cumulative) abnormal returns of these portfolios are shown in the left-
hand column of Figure B1 in Appendix B, while p-values on tests of the significance of the 
means and medians are shown in the right-hand column of the Figure. The 1992 abnormal 
returns dominate the others and, although the 2010 returns are much lower than the 1992 
ones, the p-values on both the parametric and non-parametric tests shown in the right-hand 
column – which are so low as to be almost indistinguishable – indicate that these returns are 
strongly significantly different from zero. In contrast to the closely-fought 1992 and 2010 
elections, the 1997, 2001 and 2005 election portfolios have abnormal returns that hover 
around 0 and no strong indication of significant abnormal returns related to the election.  
These results all suggest that the ˆi s are suitable data-driven measures of general political 
sensitivity. 
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5.2. Political sensitivity and political financial connections 
We now turn to the main tests of the paper. Table 2 shows the results of estimating equations 
(2), (3a) and (3b) with a full set of industry dummies, 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖
𝑘. The base industry is Utilities, a 
Group A industry. DonDirConi is an indicator of whether or not the company had a director 
who donated to the Conservatives between 2005 and 2010. We report marginal effects for the 
probit specifications. For the quantile regressions we report coefficient estimates, and mean 
and median predicted ˆi s for the 25
th, 50th (median) and 75th conditional quantiles. The table 
suggests that there is no evidence that employing a director who donates to the Conservative 
Party is associated with a company having a positive (column 1), or more generally, a higher 
value of ˆi  (columns 2 to 5); if anything the coefficient estimates point towards the opposite 
being true, although they are generally not statistically significantly different from zero. 12  
The coefficients on 𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
 imply that higher unionisation rates are associated with lower values 
of ˆi , although again are not generally statistically significant. The direction of these 
estimates would suggest that for firms in more highly unionised sectors an increase in the 
likelihood of a Conservative government might be perceived as a negative signal for future 
profitability, with firms in these sectors potentially benefitting more from the election of a 
Labour government. 
[Table 2] 
                                                        
12 We experimented with adding an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i directors made above-median 
value donations to the Conservative Party, but found no evidence that having relatively generous director donors 
has a positive association with political sensitivity. (We did not use donation values as the distribution is so 
skewed that the results are strongly influenced by outliers.) We also included an indicator variable for direct 
company donations to the Conservative Party. The coefficients were generally negative and statistically 
insignificant, and inclusion of this variable did not affect the coefficients on the director donor dummy.  
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The coefficients on the DonDirConi, and 𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
 variables in the quantile regression estimates 
reported in columns (3)-(5), and indeed across the entire conditional distribution of the ˆi s, 
always lie within the 95% confidence intervals of the OLS estimates in column (2). The same 
is true for the relationship between the political sensitivity measure and market value, and 
that with leverage, although these do exhibit some variation across the conditional 
distribution of the ˆi s. The coefficient on market value is more strongly negative and 
statistically significant for top-quantile, positive ˆi s. As discussed earlier, it appears that, for 
companies with positive ˆi s, the larger the company the lower tends to be its political 
sensitivity. The overall relationship between leverage and political sensitivity, indicated by 
the OLS estimate, is negative. But the relationship is considerably stronger in the lower ˆi  
conditional quantiles, so for these observations leverage tends to amplify political sensitivity 
as we anticipated. In line with our expectations leverage has a positive relationship with 
political sensitivity in the top quantile, although not statistically different from zero. The 
relationship is robust to alternative definitions of leverage.  
A notable feature is that some of the coefficients on the industry dummies indicate significant 
variation in political sensitivity across our two broad industry groups. The base-line industry 
is ‘Utilities’, which is in Group A. In line with the data presented in Panel B of Table 1 the 
Conservative-only donor Group A industries – and Basic Materials, and Oil and Gas in 
particular – have significantly higher ˆi s than the baseline, while Group B industries tend to 
exhibit lower values. These differences are more pronounced (and exhibit greater statistical 
significance) in the upper and lower conditional quantiles respectively, since, as Figure 3 
indicates, firms in Group A sectors are more prevalent in the upper quantiles and those in 
Group B in the lower. 
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5.2.1. Industry heterogeneity 
In Table 3 we examine heterogeneity in the main relationships of interest across the two 
broad industry groups, A and B. In Panel A we incorporate DonDirConAi and DonDirConBi, 
which interact the DonDirConi variable with the GpAi and GpBi indicators. We also replace 
the industry dummies with GpAi. Otherwise the specification is comparable to that in Table 2. 
[Table 3] 
The results reveal some differences between the Group A and Group B industries. First, in 
line with the results for the industry dummies in Table 2, the coefficient on the Group A 
dummy, GpAi, is consistently positive and statistically significant. Since the set of firms in 
Group A industries include both donor and non-donor firms (and any additional effect of 
employing a Conservative-donating director is taken account of by the relevant dummy), 
these results point to an industry-wide relationship, possibly incorporating spillovers from 
donor to non-donor firms.  
Second, for the Conservative-only donor group, A, the Conservative director-donor dummy is 
consistently positive, whereas for the mixed donor group, B, it is consistently negative – 
indicating that, if anything, for firms in Group B employing a Conservative director donor is 
associated with lower political sensitivity, relative to non-donor firms in that group. 
However, as shown at the bottom of the table, the coefficients for the two groups are 
statistically significantly different from each other only in the probit and OLS estimates. In 
terms of magnitude the OLS results suggest that, for a firm in Group A, employing a director 
who donates to the Conservative Party is associated with an additional increase in the 
political sensitivity measure of around 0.15 compared to non-donor firms in Group A, 
equivalent to a move from the median value of ˆi  to around the 75
th quantile of the 
distribution. 
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As noted above, for firms in Group B industries, in particular in the upper conditional 
quantiles of ˆi , employing a director who donates to the Conservative Party is associated 
with a decrease in ˆi . It is not immediately clear why this should be the case, therefore, to 
exclude the possibility that this coefficient is picking up some other form of cross-group 
heterogeneity, in Panel B of Table 3 we allow the coefficients on all right-hand-side variables 
to vary according to whether a company is in a Group A or Group B industry.  
The coefficients on the director-donor dummies in Panel B are largely unchanged. One 
notable difference between Panels A and B, though, is that once we allow for the full set of 
group-level interactions, the coefficients on the Group A dummy lose statistical significance, 
as there is now insufficient variation to identify differences between the Group A and Group 
B industries on average. However, as shown in Table C1 in Appendix C, if we re-estimate 
Panel B instead including the more disaggregated set of industry dummies, we continue to 
find positive and significant coefficients for individual Group A industries – Basic materials, 
Healthcare, and Oil and gas in the OLS specification. And, in line with Table 2, the 
coefficients for these industries are larger and more statistically significant in the upper end 
of the conditional quantile distribution. The inclusion of a full set of industry dummies also 
allows us to rule out the possibility that our estimates are biased due to industry-level 
unobservables. When we include the industry dummies, the coefficients on the Conservative 
donor indicator variables remain similar to those in Table 3, both in magnitude and statistical 
significance. 13  In some specifications the coefficients on the Group A and Group B 
                                                        
13  We also experimented with including an indicator of whether the firm was associated with a financial 
donation to the Labour Party (via a director or the company itself). In the OLS specification in Table 3, Panel B 
the coefficient on this Labour donor dummy was negative (-0.048) but statistically insignificant (p-value 0.48), 
and its inclusion had very little effect on the coefficient on the Group B Conservative director-donor dummy.  
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Conservative director donor dummies are also statistically significantly different to each 
other, with the former coefficient typically being positive and the latter negative. 
Of course, for both the Group A and Group B Conservative director donor dummies, there is 
always the caveat that the coefficient estimates may be influenced by firm-level 
unobservables, such as some form of selection or sorting. For example, those firms within 
Group A industries that could in any case gain the most from a Conservative government 
being in power might be more likely to try and recruit, and be a more attractive employer for, 
directors with Conservative political leanings who also donate to the party, creating a form of 
assortative matching. As shown in Table 1 Panel D, one such characteristic, potentially 
consistent with director-firm sorting within Group A industries, is that at the time of the 
election each Conservative-donating director within Group A industries sat on the board of 
only one company within our sample, whereas for Group B these directors (even when 
restricting to Conservative-only donor directors) generally sat on more than one company 
board. Hence, for Group A companies the donation is more clearly attributable to a single 
firm, while for Group B companies any potential benefit from the donation might be diluted 
or less transparent. Therefore, it is possible that the negative coefficients observed on the 
director donor dummies in Group B industries represent the net effect of a weakened positive 
relationship with ˆi , and a negatively correlated firm-level unobservable. 
Turning to the results for our measure of unionisation, the coefficients on the 𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
 variables 
in both panels of Table 3 in general remain negative, but there is some suggestion that the 
coefficients on this variable differ across the two groups of industries in the upper conditional 
quantiles.  
In summary, for industries in which firms donate only to the Conservative Party and for 
which we can therefore abstract from the influence of Labour Party donations, we find that, 
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on average, firms in these industries have higher (and more positive) political sensitivities to 
the probability of a Conservative win. However, conditional on this, comparing donor and 
non-donor firms within these industries, the results provide only a limited indication that 
political donations made by directors are associated with positive sensitivity to the electoral 
success of the Conservatives. For the set of firms in industries that make donations to both 
the Conservatives and Labour – or make no financial donations at all – director donations to 
the Conservative Party appear to have a negative relationship with our measure of political 
sensitivity. However, as we discuss below, this result is not borne out strongly in the 
robustness checks.  
5.2.2. Robustness checks 
We report on a series of robustness tests, re-estimating the equations with the two other 
sensitivity measures: the cumulative abnormal returns over days 1 to 5 following polling day 
and the ˆi  estimated using Intrade prices.  
In Table 4 we show specifications using the CARs. Panel A is equivalent to the specification 
in Table 2. The results differ from those in Table 2 in that they suggest a strong positive 
relationship between the presence of a Conservative-donating director and sensitivity to the 
election outcome. Turning to the industry dummies, we find positive and significant 
coefficients for the Basic materials industry in Group A as in Table 2, and some instances of 
negative and significant coefficients for two of the Group B industries. Panels B and C show 
specifications equivalent to those in Table 3. They suggest that in both Group A and Group B 
industries, the presence of a Conservative donor director is positively related to cumulative 
abnormal returns between polling day and the formation of the Conservative led coalition 
government. Although the coefficients on the Conservative donor indicator for Group B 
industries are more precisely identified due to the larger sample size, they are not statistically 
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significantly different from those for firms in Group A. In Panel B of Table 4 we also 
continue to find positive and statistically significant coefficients on the Group A dummy – 
firms in these industries exhibit higher cumulative abnormal returns on average, but in Panel 
C there is insufficient variation remaining to identify a statistically significant difference 
between Group A and Group B industries. 
[Table 4] 
In Table 5 we show equivalent specifications where the dependent variable is ˆi  estimated 
using Intrade prices. We find results in line with those in Tables 2 and 3, which, for the 
between-firm comparisons, do not support a clear relationship between the presence of a 
Conservative director-donor on the board and firm political sensitivity. But the results in 
Panel A of Table 5 again indicate that a number of industries in Group B exhibit lower 
political sensitivity using this alternative measure.  
[Table 5] 
Finally, in Appendix C Tables C2 and C3, we report the results of weighted least squares 
estimations using the two ˆ
i  measures (poll-based and Intrade-based) as dependent variables, 
where we weight by the t-statistic of the respective ˆ
i . These are equivalent to the 
specifications in Tables 2 and 3. For the specifications comparable to Table 2 we continue to 
find negative but statistically insignificant coefficients on the Conservative director-donor 
dummy. Examining heterogeneity by industry group, in the specifications equivalent to those 
in Table 3, when using the poll-based ˆi as the dependent variable we find only some 
indications that the coefficients on the Conservative director-donor dummies for the two 
groups of industries are statistically significantly different to each other, with those for Group 
A positive and those for Group B negative. Both Table C2 (the coefficients on the industry 
dummies) and Panel A of Table C3 (the coefficient on the Group A dummy) lend support for 
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Group A industries exhibiting higher political sensitivity to a Conservative victory than those 
in Group B. 
6. Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper is to test whether indirect forms of political financial support 
from company directors are viewed by the markets as surrogate corporate political donations, 
which have been found in the US to create party-political links, but which are subject to 
strong regulation in the UK. To do this we investigate the relationship between donations to 
the Conservative Party by company directors and companies’ political sensitivity.  
We use the relationship between changes in opinion polls and individual company returns as 
our primary firm-level measure of sensitivity to domestic political risk.  To support our main 
tests we confirm that domestic political risk appears to be priced in the UK around elections, 
and that information conveyed by opinion polls is a suitable proxy for this risk. To do this we 
link the poll-based sensitivity measure to abnormal returns on the announcement of election 
results, and exploit variation in electoral conditions over time by investigating all elections 
between 1992 and 2010.  
Focusing on the 2010 election, we present evidence that firms in a set of ‘Conservative donor 
only’ industries, where we observe corporate or director donations to the Conservative Party 
but no donations to the Labour Party, have, on average, higher and more positive sensitivities 
to the electoral fortunes of the Conservative Party. But conditional on this, we find little 
consistent evidence that for firms within this set of industries, employment of a director who 
donates to the Conservative Party is positively related to a firm’s sensitivity to the 
Conservative Party winning the election.  
Overall, the results point more strongly towards an industry-level relationship, rather than a 
relationship specific to those firms within industries employing director donors. It remains of 
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course possible that our results are driven by some form of director-industry or director-firm 
positive assortative matching, according to the benefits that industries and companies might 
derive from different parties holding political power, and director political leanings or other 
attributes.  
We provide some descriptive statistics on the characteristics of donor versus non-donor 
directors, which implies that such donor directors are typically older, and more likely to be 
UK-nationals. Given the lack of robust evidence that, over and above any industry-level 
relationship, employing a Conservative director donor is positively associated with sensitivity 
to a Conservative electoral victory, we cannot conclude that such donations are perceived as 
surrogates for corporate donations that would generate value for those firms. Instead, given 
the characteristics of the set of directors who donate, it seems more likely that these 
individual donations are made purely for consumption value, or in expectation of a private 
return to those individuals, such as a political role in government or the House of Lords 
towards the end of their career. 
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APPENDICES 
A. UK ELECTIONS BETWEEN 1992 AND 2010 
The pre-2011 UK electoral system aids identification of election campaign periods when a 
priced political factor might be measurable. Until 2011 the UK had variable-term parliaments 
with a maximum term of five years.  
Each election campaign had a clearly-defined starting point: the announcement of the election 
date approximately a month before the election took place. This announcement triggered 
intense campaigning and opinion polling, with domestic political news dominating the media. 
Consequently within this period election-related information reached the markets with high 
frequency and visibility. The relatively short campaign period, characterised by a heightened 
importance of domestic political news, means that changes in a stock’s price during this 
period are especially likely to be heavily influenced by its sensitivity to the flow of political 
information. 
Our estimation and tests of the poll-based political sensitivity measure focus on the five 
elections between 1992 and 2010. The two main contenders for government in these elections 
were the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. The UK parliamentary election system 
means that the party with the higher percentage of supporting voters is generally the eventual 
winner, although the geographical distribution of support also plays a part. The system is a 
‘first past the post’ one, in which the candidate in each constituency who wins more votes 
than any other candidate is elected to Parliament. There is no requirement to win a majority 
of the votes. The party which has more Members of Parliament than all the other parties 
forms the government. Consequently, the overall percentage of voters who support a party is 
only approximately related to the number of seats that the party will win, because the 
distribution of the voters across constituencies is also important.   
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Table A1 summarises the details of the elections we analyse that are relevant to our study. 
The table shows that decisive wins were correctly predicted by the opinion polls and the press 
in 1997 and 2001. The 2005 outcome – including the loss of Labour seats – was also 
predicted correctly.  
[Table A1]   
The 1992 and 2010 elections were different from the other three in our sample. Both of these 
elections were more closely fought than were the other three. The 1992 election was unusual 
in that the opinion polls and the press were wrong throughout the election campaign: they 
predicted a Labour win and the eventual outcome took the country by surprise. The 2010 
election was unusual in that it resulted in a hung parliament for the first time since 1974.  
Support for the third major party, the Liberal Democrats, was sufficiently strong compared 
with support for the other two parties that, although there was the possibility of an outright 
Conservative win, a hung parliament was believed to be more likely. In the event the 
Conservative Party did win more seats than the Labour Party, but not enough for an outright 
majority. Polling day was followed by a five-day period of bilateral negotiations between the 
Liberal Democrats and each of the two main parties, each attempting to form a coalition.  
Eventually the Conservatives were successful, despite the Labour Party having more political 
affinity with the Liberal Democrats. Table A2 gives a more detailed timeline relating to this 
election, which informs our decisions regarding event-period timing. 
[Table A2] 
B. TESTING THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY MEASURES 
We carry out two forms of tests of the predictions in section 3.2. In the first test we use event 
day/period returns to estimate equations of the form shown in equation (B1). 
,
ˆ
i T i iAR a b e= + + , (B1)  
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where ARi,T denotes the abnormal return on stock i on event day T, or a cumulative abnormal 
return for the 2010 election. If the ˆi s are suitable proxies for general political sensitivity, the 
less predictable is the outcome of an election, the larger and more significant should be the 
coefficient on ˆi . 
The choice of the event day for all elections other than 2010 is clear: the outcome was known 
by the end of the day following polling day. The final outcome of the 2010 election was 
revealed almost a week after polling day, and the timeline in Table A2 of Appendix A 
suggests that, given that the London Stock Exchange close of trade is at 4.30 pm, Wednesday 
12 May or Thursday 13 May are the most appropriate event days. We considered two event 
periods, cumulating abnormal returns from the day after polling day to 12 May and to 13 
May. Both yielded similar results so we present only those cumulated to 13 May. 
Since the ˆi s are estimated, they will inevitably be subject to measurement error.  To address 
this issue our second test investigates (cumulative) abnormal returns of portfolios formed 
according to the ˆi s. For each election we rank the stocks in order of ˆi  and construct an 
equally-weighted portfolio long in high- ˆi  stocks and short in low- ˆi  stocks. If our 
hypotheses are valid, the less predictable is the outcome of an election, the higher (more 
positive) should be the portfolio abnormal return on the event day. One advantage of this 
approach is that it requires only a reasonably accurate ranking of the ˆi s, rather than accurate 
estimates of their values, as in the regression test. 
The choice of the number of stocks to include in the portfolio is, of course, subjective. We 
want a sufficient number of stocks to obtain meaningful results, but not so many that 
differences between the groups are obliterated. We therefore try portfolios ranging from 30 in 
each of the high- and low- ˆi  groups, up to 100 in each group. 
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We assess whether the (cumulative) abnormal returns of the high-minus-low portfolios are 
different from zero using a parametric test and a non-parametric rank test. The parametric test 
is the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) ADJ-BMP statistic and the non-parametric test statistic is 
the GRANK-T statistic of Kolari and Pynnönen (2011). Both tests correct for the upward bias 
in test statistics caused by ignoring non-event period interdependence. We also adjust for 
event-day-induced variance, as in Patell (1976), modified for cumulative abnormal returns 
(see, for example, Salinger, 1992, p41). 
Table B1 presents the coefficients on ˆi  in equation (B1) for each of the elections (estimated 
using a Huber-White adjusted covariance matrix). For 2010 we show results for both poll-
based and Intrade-based ˆi s. Note that the poll-based and Intrade-based coefficient sizes are 
not comparable as the proxies for Δpt are of different orders of magnitude. There is little 
evidence of the election outcome, or sensitivities to that outcome, having any role in 
explaining returns for the 1997, 2001 or 2005 elections. For both 1992 and 2010 the 
coefficients on ˆi  are significant and positive. 
[Table B1] 
The portfolio-returns tests confirm the regression results. Figure B1 summarises the event-
period (cumulative) abnormal returns of the portfolios that are long in high- ˆi  and short in 
low- ˆi  firms, for between 30 to 100 firms in each set (that is, total portfolio sizes 60 to 200).  
The left-hand column shows the means and medians while the right-hand one shows the p-
values of the parametric and non-parametric tests. The Figure confirms the general picture 
presented by the regression tests. The 1992 results dominate the others: the abnormal returns 
are about five times higher and the p-values on both tests are so small as to be almost 
invisible. They also suggest that the returns are very closely related to the size of the ˆi s, 
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because as the portfolio sizes increase and stocks with less extreme ˆi s are introduced, the 
abnormal returns fall. The 2010 results – for which the abnormal returns are measured over 
the extended post-polling period – are dwarfed by the 1992 ones but both the parametric and 
non-parametric tests suggest that these returns are significantly different from zero.   
[Figure B1] 
In contrast to the closely-fought elections in 1992 and 2010, the 1997, 2001 and 2005 
election portfolios have abnormal returns that hover around 0, with p-values on both tests that 
are not significant at standard levels.  For these there is no indication of significant abnormal 
returns related to the election. 
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Table 1  Summary statistics   
 
Panel A  Donations: Firm level  
 
  Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Indicator variables 
Conservative director-donor employer (DonDirConi) 0.143 0.351 0 0 0 0 1 
Conservative company-donor (DonCoConi) 0.020 0.140 0 0 0 0 1 
Labour director-donor employer (DonDirLabi)  0.023 0.151 0 0 0 0 1 
Labour company-donor (DonCoLabi) 0.037 0.188 0 0 0 0 1 
Amounts 
Conservative director-donations (DonDir£Coni) 8,009 50,249 0 0 0 0 578,621 
DonDir£Coni, conditional on DonDir£Coni  0 55,877 123,437 1,500 2,500 7,000 25,959 578,621 
Conservative company-donations (DonCo£Coni) 742 10,365 0 0 0 0 178,000 
DonCo£Coni, conditional on DonCo£Coni  0 37,120 69,309 2,914 3,500 10,404 17,500 178,000 
Labour director-donations (DonDir£Labi) 218 2,519 0 0 0 0 42,000 
DonDir£Labi, conditional on DonDir£Labi  0 9,329 14,734 500 2,000 3,800 10,000 42,000 
Labour company-donations (DonCo£Labi) 520 5,169 0 0 0 0 82,648 
DonCo£Labi, conditional on DonCo£Labi  0 14,169 24,212 1,400 1,500 5,314 17,413 82,648 
 
 
 
 
 
Continues... 
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Panel B  Political sensitivity and donation patterns by industry  
 
 
No. of 
companies 
Mean ˆ
i  
(%) 
Mean CAR (1,5) 
(%) 
Proportion donating to  
Conservative Party 
Proportion donating to  
Labour Party 
Mean 
unionisation rate 
 
 
  
Via 
directors 
From 
company 
Via 
directors 
From 
company 
 
Group A 63 0.163 1.069 0.175 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.199 
Basic materials 24 0.193 2.955 0.167 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.198 
Healthcare 7 0.134 0.392 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.184 
Telecoms 5 0.085 0.246 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.174 
Utilities 9 -0.002 -1.027 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.249 
Oil and Gas 18 0.238 0.096 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.187 
Group B 237 -0.025 -1.675 0.135 0.017 0.030 0.046 0.185 
Industrials 57 0.071 -1.133 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.215 
Consumer goods 22 -0.092 -1.422 0.136 0.000 0.045 0.045 0.172 
Consumer services 59 -0.066 -3.685 0.085 0.034 0.017 0.085 0.214 
Financials 82 -0.022 -0.606 0.220 0.024 0.061 0.049 0.153 
Technology 17 -0.140 -2.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.154 
 
Continues... 
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Panel C  Company characteristics:  mean by industry  
 
 
Leverage LnMV RoA Tobin’s q No. of directors 
Group A 0.298* 8.154*** 8.272 3.844 9.381* 
Basic materials 0.219 8.093 8.300 3.114 9.125 
Healthcare 0.302 8.374 9.987 3.829 9.286 
Telecoms 0.419 8.830 4.622 7.998 11.400 
Utilities 0.616 8.273 7.654 3.125 9.000 
Oil and Gas 0.208 7.903 8.891 4.029 9.389 
Group B 0.368 7.316 7.823 6.922 8.738 
Industrials 0.385 7.215 9.106 4.556 8.228 
Consumer goods 0.371 7.910 6.887 2.822 9.364 
Consumer services 0.501 7.290 10.073 19.024 9.169 
Financials 0.300 7.287 5.154 1.816 8.768 
Technology 0.179 7.127 9.800 2.796 8.000 
Total no. of companies 300 300 300 300 300 
 
 
 
 
 
Continues... 
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Panel D  Donor and non-donor director characteristics:  mean by industry 
 
  No. boards in sample No. other boards Fraction Executive Fraction CEO Age British 
 
Donors  Non-donors Donors  Non-donors Donors  Non-donors Donors  Non-donors Donors  Non-donors Donors  Non-donors 
Group A 1.00 c** 1.28*** 2.58 2.90 0.42 0.31 0.25 0.11 62.00 c 57.46*** 0.83 a 0.44*** 
Basic materials 1.00 1.24 4.20 3.47 0.20 0.28 0.00 0.12 69.20 57.49 1.00  0.30 
Healthcare 1.00 1.22 2.00 2.54 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.11 62.00 58.11 1.00 0.45 
Telecoms 1.00 1.46 5.00 2.86 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.09 53.00 58.16 1.00 0.48 
Utilities n/a 1.41 n/a 2.30 n/a 0.40 n/a 0.13 n/a 56.41 n/a 0.76 
Oil and Gas 1.00 1.21 0.60 2.61 0.80 0.33 0.60 0.10 56.8 57.58 0.60 0.46 
Group B 1.49 1.36 2.75 2.79 0.24 0.31 0.15 0.12 60.34 a 56.05 0.83 a 0.62 
Industrials 1.50 1.42 2.17 2.04 0.50 0.34 0.33 0.12 55.67 56.29 1.00 0.65 
Consumer goods 1.40 1.38 2.60 2.21 0.20 0.33 0.00 0.12 63.60 55.73 1.00 0.62 
Consumer services 1.65 1.35 1.71 3.10 0.29 0.33 0.14 0.12 59.43 55.33 0.86 0.64 
Financials 1.65 1.31 3.27 3.33 0.17 0.26 0.13 0.11 61.34 56.83 0.74 0.57 
Technology n/a 1.43 n/a 2.27 n/a 0.36 n/a 0.13 n/a 54.75 n/a 0.64 
 
Notes 
1.  Panel A summarises for the whole sample donations to the two main political parties. 
DonDirConi is an indicator which equals 1 if any director on company i’s board donated to the Conservative Party between June 2005 and April 2010. 
DonDir£Coni is the total monetary value of company i’s director-donations to the Conservative Party between June 2005 and April 2010. 
DonCoConi and DonCo£Coni are the equivalent for donations directly made by company i. 
DonDirLabi, DonDir£Labi, DonCoLabi and DonCo£Labi are equivalent measures for the Labour Party 
 
2.  Panel B summarises political sensitivity at industry level, and shows the pattern of political donations and unionisation by industry, categorised into Group A industries, which 
donate only to the Conservative Party and Group B industries, which donate to both, or neither political parties. 
ˆ
i  is stock i’s opinion-poll based political sensitivity measure estimated from equation (1). 
CARi(1, 5) is the cumulative abnormal return on stock i from the day after the 2010 polling day to 13 May, 2010. 
 𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
, the degree of unionisation in the firm i’s two digit industry, j. This is measured as the fraction of workers that report being union members in 2009 and is derived from the UK 
Labour Force Survey.  
 
3.  Panel C summarises company characteristics by industry. The asterisks against the Group A industry means in row 1 of the panel denote the statistical significance of t-tests of 
differences between Group A and Group B means.  *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%;  and * at 10%.  As in Panel B, Group A industries are those which donate only to the 
Conservative Party. Group B industries donate to both, or neither political parties. 
Market value is measured at 1 March, 2010. 
 47 
Leverage = book value of debt divided by total assets, as reported in the financial statements ended in 2010. 
RoA = [Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized)  (1-Tax Rate))] / [Average of Last Year’s and Current Year’s Total Assets]  
100, as reported in the financial statements ended in 2010. 
Tobin’s q is market value divided by book value. 
No. of directors is the number of directors on the board as reported in the most recent financial statements preceding the election. 
 
4. Panel D summarises director characteristics by industry and donor status.  
Number of boards is the number of boards among the largest 300 publicly listed companies that an individual sat on prior to the 2010 election. 
Number of other boards is the number of boards of other listed and private companies that an individual sat on prior to the 2010 election. The data indicate only positive numbers for 
the number of private boards or are recorded as missing. We have coded the missing values as zero. Leaving them as missing also implies no significant differences between donors 
and non-donors, or Group A and Group B industries. 
Fraction Executive is the fraction in Executive as opposed to non-Executive roles. 
Fraction CEO is the fraction in CEO/Chairman versus other roles. 
Age is the director’s age in years. 
British is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a director is a British national. 
The asterisks against the Group A industry means in row 1 of the panel denote the statistical significance of t-tests of differences between Group A and Group B means.  *** denotes 
significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%. a, b, and c indicate the statistical significance of t-tests of differences between donor and non-donor means at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
 
 48 
Table 2 Political sensitivity, director donations and unionisation rates 
 
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConi -0.088 -0.044 -0.033 -0.048 -0.096 
 (0.298) (0.362) (0.452) (0.125) (0.095)* 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
 -0.526 -0.137 -0.216 -0.519 -0.133 
 (0.113) (0.446) (0.369) (0.003)*** (0.448) 
LnMVi -0.005 -0.022 0.016 -0.008 -0.047 
 (0.842) (0.108) (0.203) (0.437) (0.002)*** 
Leveragei -0.173 -0.080 -0.161 -0.173 0.047 
 (0.192) (0.225) (0.035)** (0.010)*** (0.542) 
Industry Dummies 
Group A: 
Basic materials 0.355 0.159 0.174 0.130 0.354 
 (0.054)* (0.105) (0.077)* (0.114) (0.000)*** 
Healthcare 0.333 0.110 0.101 0.049 0.283 
 (0.160) (0.242) (0.282) (0.489) (0.030)** 
Telecoms 0.102 0.082 0.052 -0.021 0.168 
 (0.708) (0.409) (0.453) (0.869) (0.479) 
Oil and gas 0.249 0.203 0.094 0.051 0.411 
 (0.221) (0.060)* (0.228) (0.682) (0.024)** 
Industry Dummies 
Group B: 
Industrials 0.098 0.030 -0.052 0.017 0.164 
 (0.588) (0.704) (0.534) (0.748) (0.024)** 
Consumer goods -0.112 -0.122 -0.204 -0.176 0.023 
 (0.578) (0.143) (0.025)** (0.062)* (0.809) 
Consumer services -0.092 -0.096 -0.133 -0.133 0.032 
 (0.616) (0.196) (0.044)** (0.034)** (0.652) 
Financials -0.049 -0.071 -0.066 -0.093 0.096 
 (0.793) (0.355) (0.353) (0.102) (0.205) 
Technology -0.164 -0.212 -0.455 -0.187 0.137 
 (0.453) (0.122) (0.003)*** (0.230) (0.284) 
Constant N/A 0.265 -0.105 0.303 0.421 
  (0.037)** (0.433) (0.004)*** (0.003)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.086 0.085 0.100 0.096 0.107 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Predicted iˆ  ( 100):      
Mean   -0.157 0.016 0.183 
Median   -0.148 0.014 0.182 
 
Notes 
1.  The table shows the results of estimating equation (2), Pr ( ˆPosi = 1) = Φ(𝜽𝑿𝑖) and equations (3a) and (3b), iˆ
= 𝜽𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  and iˆ = 𝜽𝒒𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑞𝑖 where 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑞 ( iˆ |𝑿𝑖) = 𝜽𝒒𝑿𝑖 . iˆ  denotes the poll-based political sensitivity of 
stock i, ˆPos
i  takes the value 1 if iˆ  is positive and 𝑿𝑖  represents a set of explanatory variables.   
2.  Explanatory variables are:  
DonDirConi, an indicator variable which equals 1 if any director on company i’s board donated to the Conservative 
Party between June 2005 and April 2010; 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
, the degree of unionisation in firm i’s two digit industry, j; 
LnMVi, log market value as at 1 March, 2010; 
Leveragei, long-term debt divided by total assets;  and 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖
𝑘, an indicator variable which equals 1 if company i is in broad industry k. The base industry is ‘Utilities’.  
Group A industries are those which donate only to the Conservative Party. Group B industries donate to both, or neither 
political parties. 
3.  All equations are estimated with Huber-White standard errors.  The probit equation coefficients presented are 
marginal effects. p-values are given in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%;  and * at 10%.
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Table 3  Political sensitivity, director donations and unionisation rates; Groups A and B  
 
Panel A 
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConAi 0.242 0.149 0.049 0.154 0.136 
 (0.246) (0.065)* (0.464) (0.261) (0.460) 
DonDirConBi -0.155 -0.085 -0.043 -0.080 -0.124 
 (0.107) (0.132) (0.494) (0.063* (0.024)** 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
  -0.467 -0.073 -0.233 -0.207 -0.368 
 (0.130) (0.674) (0.159) (0.257) (0.106) 
LnMVi -0.011 -0.027 0.002 -0.012 -0.048 
 (0.652) (0.048)** (0.874) (0.317) (0.001)*** 
Leveragei -0.200 -0.081 -0.178 -0.210 -0.001 
 (0.099)* (0.184) (0.028)** (0.005)*** (0.991) 
GpAi 0.241 0.169 0.175 0.104 0.172 
 (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.015)** (0.003)*** 
Constant N/A 0.231 -0.090 0.211 0.598 
  (0.021)*** (0.402) (0.030)*** (0.000)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.067 0.076 0.060 0.062 0.087 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.089* 0.017** 0.311 0.104 0.176 
Predicted iˆ  ( 100):      
Mean   -0.147 0.024 0.197 
Median   -0.163 0.019 0.201 
Panel B 
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConAi 0.170 0.141 0.035 0.128 0.053 
 (0.441) (0.089)* (0.693) (0.157) (0.762) 
DonDirConBi -0.150 -0.083 -0.030 -0.079 -0.134 
 (0.121) (0.144) (0.583) (0.091)* (0.017)** 
𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 -2.475 -0.092 -0.563 -0.106 2.015 
 (0.102) (0.880) (0.496) (0.886) (0.166) 
𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 -0.372 -0.068 -0.129 -0.192 -0.393 
 (0.232) (0.706) (0.424) (0.329) (0.078)* 
LnMVAi 0.109 -0.015 0.009 -0.019 -0.067 
 (0.088)* (0.478) (0.597) (0.217) (0.015)** 
LnMVBi -0.047 -0.033 -0.011 -0.015 -0.034 
 (0.124) (0.062)* (0.587) (0.368) (0.023)** 
LeverageAi -0.411 -0.117 -0.206 -0.333 -0.424 
 (0.221) (0.487) (0.106) (0.000)*** (0.139) 
LeverageBi -0.159 -0.073 -0.174 -0.129 -0.029 
 (0.214) (0.278) (0.070)* (0.121) (0.730) 
GpAi -0.417 0.049 0.126 0.188 0.094 
 (0.426) (0.846) (0.674) (0.379) (0.802) 
Constant N/A 0.266 -0.027 0.208 0.509 
  (0.028)** (0.855) (0.100)* (0.000)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.083 0.067 0.063 0.065 0.097 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.192 0.026** 0.533 0.042** 0.311 
Test 𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 = 𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 0.174 0.970 0.606 0.909 0.102 
Predicted iˆ  ( 100):      
Mean   -0.155 0.032 0.198 
Median   -0.174 0.020 0.196 
Continues... 
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1.  The table shows the results of estimating equations (3a) and (3b), iˆ = 𝜽𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  and iˆ = 𝜽𝒒𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑞𝑖 where 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑞 ( iˆ |𝑿𝑖) = 𝜽𝒒𝑿𝑖. iˆ  denotes the poll-based political sensitivity of stock i and 𝑿𝑖  represents a set of 
explanatory variables.   
2.  Explanatory variables are:  
GpAi, an indicator variable which equals 1 if company i is in Group A, industries which donate only to the Conservative 
Party;  
DonDirConAi, an indicator variable which equals 1 if company i is in Group A and any director on company i’s board 
donated to the Conservative Party between June 2005 and April 2010; and DonDirConBi, an equivalent variable for 
companies in Group B industries, those which donate to both, or neither political parties; 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
, the degree of unionisation in firm i’s two digit industry, j; 
LnMVi, log market value as at 1 March, 2010;  and 
Leveragei, book value of debt divided by total assets. 
In Panel B the last three variables are interacted with the dummy variables for Groups A and B respectively, indicated 
in each case by a suffix A or B. 
3.  p-values of F-tests are given towards the bottom of each set of regression results. 
4.  All equations are estimated with Huber-White standard errors.  p-values are given in parentheses. *** denotes 
significance at 1%; ** at 5%;  and * at 10% 
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Table 4  Robustness tests: CAR(1,5) 
 
Panel A: CAR(1, 5) Table 2 equivalent  
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConi 0.243 1.502 1.330 1.364 1.568 
 (0.004)*** (0.040)** (0.032)** (0.045)** (0.137) 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
 -0.135 2.705 3.953 -0.438 -0.020 
 (0.670) (0.419) (0.347) (0.886) (0.995) 
LnMVi -0.016 0.123 0.637 0.002 -0.454 
 (0.508) (0.602) (0.000)*** (0.993) (0.075)*** 
Leveragei 0.007 -0.018 -1.476 -0.197 -0.349 
 (0.955) (0.987) (0.156) (0.847) (0.818) 
Industry Dummies 
Group A: 
Basic materials 0.339 3.885 2.010 3.144 5.985 
 (0.097)* (0.034)** (0.432) (0.054)** (0.003)** 
Healthcare 0.205 1.361 2.540 0.818 3.673 
 (0.431) (0.454) (0.216) (0.683) (0.175) 
Telecoms 0.020 1.102 1.681 -0.092 -0.122 
 (0.946) (0.599) (0.636) (0.953) (0.981) 
Oil and gas -0.078 0.911 -0.248 -1.059 0.490 
 (0.706) (0.621) (0.903) (0.289) (0.919) 
Industry Dummies 
Group B: 
Industrials 0.008 -0.045 0.251 -0.312 0.359 
 (0.963) (0.973) (0.902) (0.726) (0.835) 
Consumer goods 0.076 -0.352 -0.210 -1.350 2.032 
 (0.710) (0.822) (0.913) (0.539) (0.296) 
Consumer services -0.129 -2.572 -1.979 -2.664 -1.454 
 (0.458) (0.055)* (0.359) (0.007)*** (0.316) 
Financials 0.015 0.465 1.728 -0.151 -0.438 
 (0.934) (0.723) (0.382) (0.849) (0.781) 
Technology -0.130 -0.590 0.073 -2.222 -1.821 
 (0.530) (0.737) (0.973) (0.028)** (0.288) 
Constant N/A -2.706 -9.684 -0.335 4.771 
  (0.258) (0.000)*** (0.825) (0.057)* 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.067 0.079 0.069 0.065 0.081 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Predicted iˆ  ( 100):      
Mean   -4.144 -0.924 1.770 
Median   -4.054 -0.750 1.361 
 
 
Continues... 
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Panel B:  CAR(1, 5) Table 3 Panel A equivalent  
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConAi 0.155 1.827 3.241 0.879 4.997 
 (0.362) (0.294) (0.035)** (0.672) (0.274) 
DonDirConBi 0.273 1.838 1.353 2.226 1.616 
 (0.004)*** (0.015)** (0.021)** (0.076)* (0.141) 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
  -0.221 0.369 -0.800 -2.431 -1.981 
 (0.445) (0.901) (0.747) (0.459) (0.565) 
LnMVi -0.008 0.188 0.536 0.002 -0.355 
 (0.751) (0.441) (0.006)** (0.990) (0.341) 
Leveragei -0.065 -1.496 -0.356 -0.203 -0.507 
 (0.554) (0.159) (0.809) (0.864) (0.737) 
GpAi 0.163 2.406 0.487 0.971 3.546 
 (0.042)** (0.009)** (0.632) (0.314) (0.009)** 
Constant N/A -2.816 -8.416 -1.017 4.027 
  (0.146) (0.000)*** (0.508) (0.131) 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.036 0.048 0.033 0.021 0.041 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.537 0.996 0.250 0.577 0.471 
 
Continues... 
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Panel C:  CAR(1, 5) Table 3 Panel B equivalent  
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConAi 0.148 1.959 1.570 1.221 6.118 
 (0.370) (0.262) (0.036)** (0.474) (0.146) 
DonDirConBi 0.284 1.825 1.549 2.003 1.697 
 (0.003)*** (0.016)** (0.087)* (0.109) (0.020)** 
𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 -0.770 -13.702 -17.098 -10.835 -16.083 
 (0.566) (0.142) (0.130) (0.590) (0.246) 
𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 -0.195 0.904 1.845 -2.980 -0.558 
 (0.512) (0.768) (0.601) (0.384) (0.855) 
LnMVAi 0.060 0.106 0.744 0.709 -0.728 
 (0.199) (0.825) (0.090)* (0.160) (0.344) 
LnMVBi -0.041 0.240 0.186 -0.307 -0.042 
 (0.188) (0.395) (0.555) (0.254) (0.917) 
LeverageAi 0.261 1.550 3.949 3.077 -1.040 
 (0.361) (0.552) (0.034)** (0.362) (0.843) 
LeverageBi -0.109 -1.998 -1.418 -0.577 -1.395 
 (0.365) (0.089)* (0.467) (0.670) (0.328) 
GpAi -0.468 5.232 -1.145 -7.055 11.703 
 (0.187) (0.283) (0.782) (0.287) (0.125) 
Constant N/A -3.107 -5.780 1.451 1.800 
  (0.159) (0.018)** (0.470) (0.527) 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.050 0.045 0.051 0.034 0.046 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.465 0.944 0.985 0.711 0.300 
Test 𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 = 𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 0.675 0.137 0.109 0.700 0.274 
 
Notes 
1.  The table shows results of replicating the regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3. See notes to Tables 2 and 3 for 
definitions of the independent variables. 
2.  CAR(1, 5) is the cumulative abnormal return on stock i from the day after the 2010 polling day to 13 May, 2010. For 
the probit model the dependent variable takes the value 1 for positive values of CAR(1,5). 
3.  p-values are given in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%;  and * at 10%.  
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Table 5  Robustness tests: Intrade ˆ
i  
 
Panel A:  Intrade ˆ
i  Table 2 equivalent  
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConi 0.009 -0.005 0.001 -0.007 -0.019 
 (0.915) (0.497) (0.908) (0.332) (0.026)** 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
 -0.161 0.001 0.015 -0.013 -0.004 
 (0.602) (0.983) (0.702) (0.623) (0.896) 
LnMVi -0.040 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.110) (0.010)*** (0.711) (0.104) (0.096)* 
Leveragei -0.330 -0.038 -0.028 -0.029 -0.045 
 (0.007)*** (0.002)*** (0.056)* (0.003)*** (0.000)*** 
Industry Dummies 
Group A: 
Basic materials -0.100 -0.011 -0.013 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.635) (0.526) (0.641) (0.908) (0.920) 
Healthcare -0.051 -0.017 -0.015 0.002 -0.009 
 (0.850) (0.384) (0.660) (0.798) (0.675) 
Telecoms 0.124 -0.013 -0.019 -0.008 -0.033 
 (0.633) (0.479) (0.511) (0.683) (0.478) 
Oil and gas -0.223 -0.016 -0.033 -0.016 0.010 
 (0.313) (0.405) (0.193) (0.429) (0.675) 
Industry Dummies 
Group B: 
Industrials 0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.994) (0.635) (0.771) (0.815) (0.946) 
Consumer goods -0.232 -0.030 -0.027 -0.026 -0.020 
 (0.268) (0.049)** (0.285) (0.060)* (0.305) 
Consumer services -0.244 -0.028 -0.028 -0.021 -0.007 
 (0.194) (0.058)* (0.264) (0.012)** (0.712) 
Financials -0.191 -0.031 -0.023 -0.023 -0.008 
 (0.313) (0.039)** (0.351) (0.003)*** (0.704) 
Technology -0.396 -0.042 -0.055 -0.034 -0.012 
 (0.070)* (0.059)* (0.053)* (0.276) (0.548) 
Constant N/A 0.098 0.022 0.065 0.093 
  (0.000)*** (0.490) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.064 0.066 0.061 0.046 0.066 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Predicted iˆ  ( 100):      
Mean   -0.014 0.013 0.045 
Median   -0.012 0.013 0.046 
 
Continues... 
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Panel B:  Intrade ˆ
i  Table 3 Panel A equivalent  
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConAi -0.047 -0.006 -0.009 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.772) (0.638) (0.429) (0.921) (0.762) 
DonDirConBi 0.026 -0.007 0.009 -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.773) (0.478) (0.430) (0.511) (0.074)* 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
  -0.039 0.023 0.013 0.025 0.014 
 (0.896) (0.448) (0.701) (0.400) (0.688) 
LnMVi -0.041 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.101) (0.006)*** (0.479) (0.037)** (0.027)** 
Leveragei -0.270 -0.031 -0.028 -0.019 -0.037 
 (0.011)** (0.003)*** (0.039)** (0.069)* (0.002)*** 
GpAi 0.093 0.014 0.007 0.018 0.005 
 (0.244) (0.055)* (0.529) (0.016)** (0.624) 
Constant N/A 0.071 0.006 0.052 0.090 
  (0.000)*** (0.765) (0.007)*** (0.000)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.031 0.053 0.023 0.027 0.052 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.693 0.965 0.260 0.780 0.409 
 
Continues... 
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Panel C:  Intrade ˆ
i  Table 3 Panel B equivalent  
 Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConAi -0.042 -0.004 -0.012 0.000 0.000 
 (0.796) (0.739) (0.291) (0.984) (0.982) 
DonDirConBi 0.026 -0.007 0.008 -0.009 -0.019 
 (0.767) (0.485) (0.396) (0.235) (0.024)** 
𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 -0.411 0.152 0.018 0.202 0.296 
 (0.774) (0.228) (0.935) (0.209) (0.006)*** 
𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 -0.028 0.016 0.006 0.016 -0.001 
 (0.925) (0.614) (0.891) (0.566) (0.977) 
LnMVAi -0.038 -0.007 -0.001 -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.409) (0.025)** (0.801) (0.036)** (0.001)*** 
LnMVBi -0.042 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.151) (0.029)** (0.827) (0.411) (0.152) 
LeverageAi -0.073 -0.002 0.010 -0.004 -0.029 
 (0.799) (0.917) (0.798) (0.852) (0.299) 
LeverageBi -0.302 -0.036 -0.035 -0.029 -0.045 
 (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.029)** (0.014)** (0.000)*** 
GpAi 0.065 -0.026 -0.008 0.012 0.012 
 (0.894) (0.553) (0.897) (0.808) (0.717) 
Constant N/A 0.076 0.002 0.038 0.086 
  (0.001)*** (0.939) (0.069)* (0.000)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.032 0.051 0.025 0.032 0.069 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.711 0.880 0.175 0.687 0.111 
Test 𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 = 𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 0.794 0.296 0.958 0.255 0.008*** 
 
Notes 
1.  The table shows results of replicating the regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3. See notes to Tables 2 and 3 for 
definitions of the independent variables. 
2.  Intrade iˆ  is stock i’s Intrade-price based political sensitivity measure estimated from equation (1). 
3.  p-values are given in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%. 
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Figure 1  Sources of political finance 2005 to 2010 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
1.  The figure summarizes the sources of political finance for the main two political parties. The y-axis denotes the 
monetary value of all donations between June 2005 and March 2010 in £millions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Timeline of estimation and event periods for the 2010 election 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1.  The Figure shows the estimation and event periods, not to scale. The estimation period is 250 days ending 2 months 
before the election is called, plus the ‘campaign period’, the interval during which opinion polls are revised on a daily 
basis. Abnormal returns are cumulated over the event period (see footnote 8). 
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Figure 3  Kernel density plots of ˆ
i  and CAR(1,5) for Group A and Group B industries 
 
 
Density ˆ
i                      Density CAR(1,5) 
 
Notes 
1.  The figure shows kernel density plots of the distributions of 
iˆ  and CAR(1,5) for firms in Group A and Group B 
industries. Group A are industries which donate only to the Conservative Party. Group B are mixed-donor or no-donor 
industries. 
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APPENDICES’ TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table A1. Brief description of the five elections 
 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Date election called 11 March 1992 17 March 1997 8 May 2001 (Note 1) 5 April 2005 6 April 2010  
Polling date 9 April 1992 1 May 1997 7 June 2001 5 May 2005 6 May 2010 
Incumbent party Conservative Conservative Labour Labour Labour 
Winning party Conservative  Labour  Labour  Labour  Hung (Conservatives became 
majority party in coalition) 
% lead of winning party over rival 10 38 38 24 7 
Prediction when election called Labour to win with 
small majority 
Labour 
landslide win 
Labour landslide win Labour to win with 
reduced majority 
Conservatives to win most seats, 
possibly not enough for outright 
majority 
 
Notes 
1.  Polling date widely expected to be 3 May 2001, to coincide with local elections, but on 3 April Prime Minister Blair announced a postponement due to country-wide travel 
restrictions imposed to prevent the spread of foot and mouth disease. 
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Table A2. Timeline for the 2010 election   
 
Thursday 6 May 2010, 22:00 BST Polls close and coalition negotiations begin. 
Monday 10 May, 17:00 BST Gordon Brown publicly recognises that he is an 
obstacle to the formation of a Labour/Liberal Democrat 
coalition government. Announces that he will step 
down as Labour Party leader by September 2010, in the 
hope that this will make the coalition viable. 
Tuesday 11 May, 19:20 BST Gordon Brown resigns as Prime Minister, following 
which David Cameron invited to form a government. 
Early hours of Wednesday 12 May Coalition deal between Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats confirmed.  Initial agreement published.  
Negotiations begin about Cabinet posts. 
Wednesday 12 May, 14:22 BST 
 
Wednesday 12 May, various times 
David Cameron and Nick Clegg give first joint press 
conference. 
Government posts announced throughout the day, 
continuing after markets closed. 
 
Sources: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8677552.stm 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-2010/7558554/General-Election-2010-live.html 
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Table B1.  Pricing of political risk during five elections  
 
 
 Regression of abnormal 
return on 
iˆ  
1992 
 
10.255 
  (0.000)*** 
1997 
 
-1.262 
  (0.833) 
2001  1.182 
  (0.484) 
2005  1.584 
  (0.128) 
2010 Polls 5.995 
  (0.000)*** 
 Intrade 25.929 
  (0.001)*** 
 
Notes 
1.  The first column presents the coefficient on 
iˆ  in equation (B1), , ˆi T i iAR a b e= + +  where iˆ  is stock i’s political sensitivity 
measure estimated from equation (1) and ,i TAR is calculated using parameters estimated in equation (1). When T relates to 
more than one day (for the 2010 election), ,i TAR  denotes a cumulative abnormal return. Results are presented for iˆ s calculated 
using changes in opinion polls; for the 2010 election they are also presented for 
iˆ s calculated using changes in Intrade share 
prices. 
2.  For all elections other than 2010, the announcement-day abnormal return is measured on the day after polling day. 2010 returns 
are cumulated from the day after polling day to 13 May, as described in the text. 
3.  p-values in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%;  and * at 10%. 
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Figure B1  Portfolio abnormal returns on results announcement day  
 
Year of election 
 
 
 
Mean and median abnormal returns 
 
Unbroken line = mean return;   
dashed line = median return 
ADJ-BMP and GRANK-T statistics (p-values) 
Unbroken heavy line = ADJ_BMP statistic p-
value;  dashed line = GRANK-T statistic p-value;   
unbroken faint lines are p = 0.05 and 0.1 
   
1992  
(Note difference in 
scale) 
  
1997 
  
2001 
  
2005 
  
2010:  Portfolios formed 
using 
iˆ  estimates based 
on opinion polls:  CARs to 
13 May, 2010 
  
2010:  Portfolios formed 
using 
iˆ  estimates based 
on Intrade prices:  CARs 
to 13 May, 2010 
  
 
Continues... 
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Notes 
1.  The Figure summarises the (cumulative) announcement-day abnormal returns of portfolios formed by going long on high-
iˆ  
stocks and short on low-
iˆ  stocks, as described in the text.  Portfolio sizes are shown on the x-axes and abnormal returns or p-
values on the y-axes. 
2.  For all elections other than 2010, the abnormal return is measured on the day after polling day.  2010 returns are cumulated 
from the day after polling day to 13 May. Results are presented for 
iˆ s calculated using changes in opinion polls; for the 2010 
election they are also presented for 
iˆ s calculated using changes in Intrade share prices. 
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APPENDIX C.  ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Table C1  Equivalent to Table 3 Panel B with industry dummies 
Dep var ˆ
i    Probit OLS Quantile regressions 
   0.25 0.50 0.75 
DonDirConAi 0.247 0.103 0.039 0.095 0.112 
 (0.155) (0.182) (0.500) (0.442) (0.368) 
DonDirConBi -0.158 -0.094 -0.074 -0.058 -0.134 
 (0.118) (0.099)* (0.295) (0.163) (0.001)*** 
𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 -1.808 0.678 -0.772 -0.166 0.701 
 (0.294) (0.264) (0.291) (0.829) (0.486) 
𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 -0.458 -0.156 -0.212 -0.557 -0.070 
 (0.173) (0.406) (0.412) (0.005)*** (0.670) 
LnMVAi 0.117 -0.018 0.029 -0.034 -0.075 
 (0.081)* (0.399) (0.046)** (0.258) (0.003)*** 
LnMVBi -0.043 -0.028 0.021 -0.005 -0.044 
 (0.170) (0.106) (0.358) (0.740) (0.002)*** 
LeverageAi 0.063 0.168 -0.114 -0.208 0.177 
 (0.889) (0.469) (0.608) (0.554) (0.307) 
LeverageBi -0.172 -0.100 -0.190 -0.196 0.014 
 (0.225) (0.166) (0.042)** (0.010)** (0.869) 
Industry Dummies Group A: 
Basic materials 0.384 0.276 0.103 0.136 0.415 
 (0.115) (0.015)** (0.520) (0.451) (0.003)*** 
Healthcare 0.297 0.219 -0.043 -0.001 0.347 
 (0.375) (0.090)* (0.783) (0.993) (0.007)*** 
Telecoms -0.078 0.160 -0.034 0.031 0.371 
 (0.825) (0.214) (0.817) (0.921) (0.061)* 
Oil and gas 0.274 0.315 0.038 0.108 0.440 
 (0.338) (0.043)** (0.790) (0.630) (0.004)*** 
Industry Dummies Group B: 
Industrials 0.666 0.480 -0.093 -0.127 0.212 
 (0.125) (0.118) (0.800) (0.661) (0.388) 
Consumer goods 0.515 0.332 -0.243 -0.321 0.074 
 (0.198) (0.279) (0.512) (0.288) (0.774) 
Consumer services 0.629 0.356 -0.169 -0.280 0.073 
 (0.196) (0.237) (0.643) (0.339) (0.766) 
Financials 0.708 0.383 -0.096 -0.233 0.158 
 (0.172) (0.200) (0.789) (0.425) (0.518) 
Technology 0.489 0.228 -0.503 -0.328 0.174 
 (0.237) (0.473) (0.179) (0.313) (0.496) 
Constant N/A -0.124 -0.088 0.438 0.356 
  (0.649) (0.781) (0.105) (0.109) 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.109 0.089 0.102 0.101 0.122 
N 300 300 300 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.048** 0.041** 0.216 0.239 0.061* 
Test 𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 = 𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 0.441 0.189 0.470 0.622 0.450 
Predicted iˆ  ( 100):      
Mean   -0.164 0.024 0.181 
Median   -0.159 0.012 0.178 
 
    Continues... 
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Notes 
1.  The table shows the results of estimating equations (3a) and (3b), iˆ = 𝜽𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  and iˆ = 𝜽𝒒𝑿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑞𝑖 where 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑞 ( iˆ |𝑿𝑖) = 𝜽𝒒𝑿𝑖. iˆ  denotes the poll-based political sensitivity of stock i and 𝑿𝑖  represents a set of explanatory 
variables.   
2.  Explanatory variables are:  
DonDirConAi, an indicator variable which equals 1 if company i is in Group A and any director on company i’s board donated to 
the Conservative Party between June 2005 and April 2010; and DonDirConBi, an equivalent variable for companies in Group B 
industries, those which donate to both, or neither political parties; 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
, the degree of unionisation in firm i’s two digit industry, j; 
LnMVi, log market value as at 1 March, 2010;  and 
Leveragei, book value of debt divided by total assets. 
The last three variables are interacted with the dummy variables for Groups A and B respectively, indicated in each case by a 
suffix A or B. 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖
𝑘, an indicator variable which equals 1 if company i is in broad industry k. The base industry is ‘Utilities’.  
3.  p-values of F-tests are given towards the bottom of each set of regression results. 
4.  All equations are estimated with Huber-White standard errors.  p-values are given in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 
1%; ** at 5%;  and * at 10% 
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Table C2 Robustness: weighted least squares equivalent to Table 2 
 
 ˆ
i  Poll ˆi  Intrade 
DonDirConi -0.141 -0.006 
 (0.130) (0.733) 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
 -0.199 0.006 
 (0.495) (0.936) 
LnMVi -0.039 -0.014 
 (0.133) (0.005)*** 
Leveragei -0.145 -0.073 
 (0.196) (0.001)*** 
Industry Dummies Group A: 
Basic materials 0.164 -0.034 
 (0.370) (0.200) 
Healthcare 0.084 -0.067 
 (0.622) (0.047) 
Telecoms 0.115 -0.046 
 (0.512) (0.149) 
Oil and gas 0.372 -0.036 
 (0.041)** (0.242) 
Industry Dummies Group B: 
Industrials -0.002 -0.029 
 (0.990) (0.249) 
Consumer goods -0.226 -0.066 
 (0.158) (0.011)** 
Consumer services -0.204 -0.072 
 (0.185) (0.007)*** 
Financials -0.147 -0.073 
 (0.354) (0.007)*** 
Technology -0.415 -0.085 
 (0.068)* (0.017)** 
Constant 0.499 0.208 
 (0.043)*** (0.000)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.187 0.197 
N 300 300 
 
Notes 
1.  The table shows results of replicating the regression specification reported in Table 2, using as dependent variables the two 
political sensitivity measures indicated in the column headings, using weighted least squares. In each case the weights are the t-
statistic of the relevant ˆ
i . See notes to Table 2 for definitions of independent variables. 
2. iˆ  Poll denotes the poll-based political sensitivity of stock i. Intrade iˆ  is stock i’s Intrade-price based political sensitivity. 
Both are estimated from equation (1). 
3.  p-values are given in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%. 
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Table C3 Weighted least squares: equivalent to Table 3 
 
Panel A  
 
iˆ  Poll Intrade iˆ  
DonDirConAi 0.117 -0.008 
 (0.280) (0.673) 
DonDirConBi -0.166 -0.010 
 (0.144) (0.657) 
𝑈𝑁𝑖
𝑗
  -0.103 0.059 
 (0.736) (0.420) 
LnMVi -0.048 -0.014 
 (0.067)* (0.010)** 
Leveragei -0.124 -0.065 
 (0.239) (0.001)*** 
GpAi 0.321 0.028 
 (0.000)*** (0.031)** 
Constant 0.386 0.135 
 (0.037)** (0.001)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.140 0.147 
N 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.068* 0.942 
 
Panel B 
 
iˆ  Poll Intrade iˆ  
DonDirConAi 0.127 -0.001 
 (0.278) (0.943) 
DonDirConBi -0.165 -0.009 
 (0.152) (0.676) 
𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 0.201 0.346 
 (0.838) (0.019)** 
𝑈𝑁𝐵𝑖
𝑗
 -0.122 0.039 
 (0.698) (0.613) 
LnMVAi -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.728) (0.024)** 
LnMVBi -0.058 -0.016 
 (0.066)* (0.018)** 
LeverageAi -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.976) (0.811) 
LeverageBi -0.135 -0.073 
 (0.235) (0.001)*** 
GpAi -0.099 -0.093 
 (0.838) (0.203) 
Constant 0.466 0.157 
 (0.029)** (0.001)*** 
Pseudo Rsq/AdjRsq 0.134 0.161 
N 300 300 
Test DonDirConAi = DonDirConBi 0.076* 0.775 
 
Notes 
1.  The table shows results of replicating the regression specification reported in Table 3, using as dependent variables the two 
political sensitivity measures indicated in the column headings, using weighted least squares. In each case the weights are the t-
statistic of the relevant ˆi . See notes to Table 3 for definitions of independent variables. 
2. iˆ  Poll denotes the poll-based political sensitivity of stock i. Intrade iˆ  is stock i’s Intrade-price based political sensitivity. 
Both are estimated from equation (1). 
3.  p-values are given in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%. 
 
